**Gödel’s incompleteness theorems** are two theorems of mathematical logic that state inherent limitations of all but the most trivial axiomatic systems for arithmetic.

Gödel’s first incompleteness theorem states that:

*Any effectively generated theory capable of expressing elementary arithmetic cannot be both consistent and complete. In particular, for any consistent, effectively generated formal theory that proves certain basic arithmetic truths, there is an arithmetical statement that is true, ^{[1]} but not provable in the theory (Kleene 1967).*

The liar paradox is the sentence “This sentence is false.

Gödel’s second incompleteness theorem can be stated as follows:

*For any formal effectively generated theory* T *including basic arithmetical truths and also certain truths about formal provability,* T *includes a statement of its own consistency if and only if* T *is inconsistent.*

### Arithmetization of syntax

The main problem in fleshing out the proof described above is that it seems at first that to construct a statement *p* that is equivalent to “*p* cannot be proved”, *p* would have to somehow contain a reference to *p*, which could easily give rise to an infinite regress. Gödel’s ingenious trick, which was later used by Alan Turing in his work on the Entscheidungsproblem, is to represent statements as numbers, which is often called the arithmetization of syntax. This allows a self-referential formula to be constructed in a way that avoids any infinite regress of definitions.

To begin with, every formula or statement that can be formulated in our system gets a unique number, called its **Gödel number**. This is done in such a way that it is easy to mechanically convert back and forth between formulas and Gödel numbers. It is similar, for example, to the way English sentences are encoded as sequences (or “strings”) of numbers using ASCII: such a sequence is considered as a single (if potentially very large) number. Because our system is strong enough to reason about *numbers*, it is now also possible to reason about *formulas* within the system.

A formula *F*(*x*) that contains exactly one free variable *x* is called a *statement form* or *class-sign*. As soon as *x* is replaced by a specific number, the statement form turns into a *bona fide* statement, and it is then either provable in the system, or not. For certain formulas one can show that for every natural number n, F(n) is true if and only if it can be proven (the precise requirement in the original proof is weaker, but for the proof sketch this will suffice). In particular, this is true for every specific arithmetic operation between a finite number of natural numbers, such as “2*3=6”.

Statement forms themselves are not statements and therefore cannot be proved or disproved. But every statement form *F*(*x*) can be assigned with a Gödel number which we will denote by **G**(*F*). The choice of the free variable used in the form *F*(*x*) is not relevant to the assignment of the Gödel number **G**(*F*).

Now comes the trick: T**he notion of provability itself can also be encoded by Gödel numbers**, in the following way. Since a proof is a list of statements which obey certain rules, we can define the Gödel number of a proof. Now, for every statement *p*, we may ask whether a number *x* is the Gödel number of its proof. The relation between the Gödel number of *p* and *x*, the Gödel number of its proof, is an arithmetical relation between two numbers. Therefore there is a statement form Bew(*x*) that uses this arithmetical relation to state that a Gödel number of a proof of *x* exists:

Bew(*y*) = ∃ *x* ( *y* is the Gödel number of a formula and *x* is the Gödel number of a proof of the formula encoded by *y*).

The name **Bew** means provable ( German word) . An important feature of the formula Bew(*y*) is that if a statement *p* is provable in the system then Bew(**G**(*p*)) is also provable. This is because any proof of *p* would have a corresponding Gödel number, the existence of which causes Bew(**G**(*p*)) to be satisfied.

### Prolog creates Gödel numbers

Prolog’s type system uses Gödel numbers internally. Prolog uses the resolution theorem (by John Alan Robinson) for showing which clauses are satifsfiable.

In mathematical logic and automated theorem proving, **resolution** is a rule of inference leading to a refutation theorem-proving technique for sentences in propositional logic and first-order logic. In other words, iteratively applying the resolution rule in a suitable way allows for telling whether a propositional formula is satisfiable and for proving that a first-order formula is unsatisfiable. This method may prove the satisfiability of a first-order satisfiable formula, but not always, as it is the case for all methods for first-order logic.

### The relation of the symbolic atomistic model for proving software and the incompleteness theorems

The atomistic model simulates code symbols as an automaton each. The output of the simulated clauses (side effcts) is not complete as itself, but it allows the user to find possible contradictions or logical errors in the code by connecting the symbols that are causing side effects the the output states (the side effect elements).

Some links:

- http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Resolution_principle
- http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/G%C3%B6del%27s_incompleteness_theorems#Arithmetization_of_syntax

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